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Government Takings and Constitutional Guarantees:
When Date of Valuation Statutes Deny Just
Compensation
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the oldest case of a government’s exercise of eminent
domain is recorded in the Bible.1 King Ahab, ruler in Israel, saw and
desired to possess Naboth’s vineyard, a fertile plot of land located
near Ahab’s home.2 Ahab, not necessarily disposed to tyrannically
expropriating his subjects’ property, offered Naboth another
vineyard or money for the property.3 Naboth refused, for which he
was ultimately stoned to death.4 Ahab gained his desire and even
apparently avoided paying compensation.5
Today, the effects of exercising the eminent domain right are
much less severe for landowners than in Naboth’s case. Federal and
state governments in the United States may exercise the right only to
take land for a “public use” and only if they also compensate the
landowners for the value of the condemned6 property. Compensa1. See CARMAN F. RANDOLPH, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED
STATES § 4 (photo. reprint 1991) (1894).
2. 1 Kings 21:1–2 (King James).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 21:3–4, :13–14. Naboth refused to sell because to do so would have violated
his religious law; he said to Ahab, “The Lord forbid it me, that I should give the inheritance of
my fathers unto thee.” Id. at 21:3; see also Deuteronomy 19:14 (King James).
Naboth’s stoning was effected through two false witnesses. 1Kings 21:11–13. After
Ahab learned that Naboth would not sell, he returned home sulking and complaining. Id. at
21:4. When Ahab’s wife Jezebel discovered what was wrong, she responded, likely exclaiming
to her husband, “Dost thou now govern the kingdom of Israel?” Id. at 21:7. Jezebel
immediately set about devising Naboth’s death. See id. at 21:7–10. She wrote letters in Ahab’s
name to local officials who arranged for two witnesses to testify that Naboth had blasphemed
God and the king. Id. at 21:8–14. The penalty for such a crime was death by stoning. See id. at
21:13; Leviticus 24:16 (King James).
5. Ahab actually paid sorely for his taking. As he went to possess Naboth’s vineyard, he
encountered Elijah, a prophet, who cursed him for killing Naboth and possessing his
inheritance. 1 Kings 21:17–29.
6. Often, the concepts “eminent domain” and “land condemnation” are used
interchangeably, though they are clearly distinct. While “eminent domain” is the right of the
government to take land, denoting an inherent capacity, “land condemnation” is the act of
taking the land. See J.D. EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 13 (2d ed. 1995).
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tion—or “just compensation,” as it appears in the United States
Constitution7—requires that the landowner be put in the position he
or she would have occupied had the government not taken the land.8
While this notion of just compensation has not always accompanied
the eminent domain right,9 it is difficult to imagine a just scheme
today that fails to compensate landowners for government takings.10
In any event, the Constitution requires it.
Despite the need for providing just compensation, determining
the proper amount in individual cases has presented a significant
challenge to courts and legislatures. The challenge arises in part
because land values change over time, and so, in order to make a
present value determination, a court or a legislature must set a date
on which to value the property. In a majority of states, this valuation
date is set by statute. Unfortunately, these valuation date statutes can
become controversial when a significant time period passes between
the valuation date and the time the government actually takes the
land if the land’s value materially changes during that period. If the
land value increases significantly, then paying the landowner the
amount determined on the date of valuation is not adequate
compensation, and the date of valuation statute fails to provide the
constitutionally required just compensation.
Notwithstanding the constitutional importance of this valuation
problem, the principle of just compensation and its related valuation
date issue have not been dominant themes in eminent domain
jurisprudence. In fact, since the Supreme Court’s 1922 decision in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,11 the topic of regulatory takings—
takings effected by government regulation rather than through direct
action against landowners—has commanded the majority of atten-

7. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
8. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
9. See EATON, supra note 6, at 14; see also infra Part II.A.
10. This assertion is not to say that the government can never take property without
compensating the owner. The police, war, and tax powers all permit the government to take
private property without compensation, but these powers are theoretically distinct from the
eminent domain right. See RANDOLPH, supra note 1, §§ 8–25.
11. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Pennsylvania Coal represented a significant turn in takings
jurisprudence. For the first time, the Supreme Court ruled that a government-imposed
regulation could actually constitute a taking of private property for public use. See id. at 414–
16. Consequently, the landowner in Pennsylvania Coal had a right to compensation for the
damages suffered as a result of the regulation. See id. at 415–16.
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tion when courts and academics have examined eminent domain
jurisprudence.12 This attention likely arises from the difficulties
associated with determining when a government regulation is
actually a taking of private property for public use—there is much
room for debate. Nevertheless, within the realm of direct land
condemnation, valuation date law has been more quietly developing,
and the application of various valuation date statutes in recent years
has imbued the topic with renewed vigor.13
This Comment outlines the parameters of the valuation date
problem, which often pits statutory provisions against state and
federal constitutional mandates. Part II provides insight into the
valuation date problem by laying out historical eminent domain
underpinnings and a just compensation framework. It also discusses
each of the fifty states’ varying statutory positions (or lack of
positions) on dates of valuation.14 Part III examines the date of
valuation problem, as well as the related takings date problem and
summarizes several leading judicial responses to conflict between
statutory dates of valuation and the constitutional just compensation
requirement. Before a brief conclusion in Part V, Part IV tracks
possible legislative reactions to the date of valuation problem.
Ultimately, this Comment suggests guidelines for providing just
compensation when a date of valuation statute fails to meet the
constitutional mandate.

12. See Nicholas Mercuro, The Takings Issue: A Continuing Dilemma in Law and
Economics, in TAKING PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION: LAW AND ECONOMICS
PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAKINGS ISSUE 1, 1–6 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1992), for a discussion
that characterizes the problem of determining when government regulation becomes a taking
as the takings issue.
Because of its scope, this Comment will not include much discussion of the regulatory
takings issue. There is, however, a wealth of literature on the topic as it continues to demand
the attention of some of the nation’s leading scholars. See, e.g., TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS
ISSUES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002); 1 THOMAS J.
MICELI & KATHLEEN SEGERSON, THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS:
COMPENSATION FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1996); TAKING
PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1992).
13. For examples of recent state cases dealing with these statutes, see infra Part III.B.2.
14. This Comment focuses on statutory valuation date standards. Necessarily, every state
has articulated some kind of valuation date standard; slightly more than half have done so
through statute. See infra app. Other states use judicially-created standards, which are already
well documented in treatise material. See, e.g., 5 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 18.16 (3d ed. 2001); 11A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 32.97 (3d ed. 2000).
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II. EMINENT DOMAIN, JUST COMPENSATION, AND
VALUATION DATE STATUTES
Date of valuation statutes have grown out of an administrative
need for states to define procedures that govern the exercise of the
eminent domain right. Despite this administrative need, however,
state eminent domain procedures ultimately must abide by the
theoretical underpinnings of the eminent domain right and the
principle of just compensation. This Part of the Comment describes
these underpinnings and provides a context in which to view the
valuation date problem described in Part III. Section A speaks in
general terms about the history of the eminent domain right and the
constitutional principle of just compensation, and section B focuses
on the states’ varied statutory approaches to valuation date
determination.
A. Historical and Constitutional Framework for the Government’s
Eminent Domain Right
The right of eminent domain inheres in the power of a
sovereign.15 Importantly, eminent domain is a right, not actual
control or ownership, and until the government exercises the right,
the government cannot properly use the private property of
individuals16 unless operating under the police, war, or taxation
powers. Because governments have the eminent domain right by
virtue of being the government, a constitution cannot technically
grant this power,17 though it can limit the power as exercised.
Consequently, the United States Constitution and almost all state
constitutions include provisions that relate to this governmental
power.18

15. See RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 3 (“There must be a common basis for federal and
state eminent domain, and it is found in sovereignty pure and simple.”).
16. See id. § 2. The original Latin term “dominium eminens” has become our modernday “eminent domain.” See id. Randolph explains that the translation of the term “dominium”
into “domain,” which signifies the right to control a thing, rather than “dominion,” which
signifies a thing controlled, emphasizes the term’s precise meaning. Id.
17. See EATON, supra note 6, at 14.
18. See Sidney Z. Searles, The Law of Eminent Domain in the U.S.A., A.L.I.-A.B.A.
COURSE OF STUDY: EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND VALUATION LITIGATION 333, 335–36
(1995). The only exception is North Carolina, which has a statutory eminent domain scheme
that limits the government’s eminent domain right. Id.
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A brief historical sketch of the nature and extent of the eminent
domain right is helpful to understanding its constitutional impact.
While the ultimate origin of the concept of eminent domain is
unknown,19 the right has found expression in a variety of bygone
cultures, including the ancient Greek and Roman societies20 and the
English feudal order, in which sovereign lords could effectively take
land they desired without compensating those who previously used
it.21 The earliest use of the term “eminent domain” was probably in
the seventeenth century writings of Hugo Grotius, who stated that
“the property of subjects under the law of eminent domain belongs
to the state, so that the state, or the person who represents the state,
can make use of that property, can even destroy or alienate it . . .
whenever it is to the public advantage.”22 The first formal declaration
of the related just compensation principle occurred in France’s 1789
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen: “Property
being an inviolable and sacred right, no one can be deprived of it
unless the public necessity plainly demands it, and upon condition of
a just and previous indemnity.”23
In the latter end of the eighteenth century, certain philosophical
views came to bear not only on those who drafted France’s
Declaration of the Rights of Man, but also on the Framers of the
United States Constitution. Chiefly, John Locke’s writings
influenced the Founders’ views on private property and their
intention that the Constitution protect private property rights.24
Locke emphasized that individual labor created property rights.25
Commenting on the power of eminent domain (though not
19. EATON, supra note 6, at 14.
20. See RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 4; see also Searles, supra note 18, at 335 (citing
CORNELIUS TACITUS, THE ANNALS OF TACITUS (Encyclopedia Britannica 1952)).
21. See RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 5; Searles, supra note 18, at 335.
22. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 402 (Louise R. Loomis trans.,
Walter J. Black, Inc. 1949) (1625); see also RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 5; Searles, supra note
18, at 335.
23. RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 6 (quoting DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN,
art. XVI (1789)).
24. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 16 (1985).
25. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT paras. 27–32, at 17–
20 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., The Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690) (“[E]very man has a
property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. The labor of his body
and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his . . . . As much land as a man tills,
plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property.”).
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explicitly calling it so), Locke said, “[T]he supreme power cannot
take from any man part of his property without his own
consent . . . .”26 Indeed, in Locke’s view, the purpose of a
government’s existence is to preserve private property,27 and he
would condition a government’s exercise of the eminent domain
right on the consent of the governed.28 Some commentators suggest
that Locke’s “consent” is a flaw in his theory, even though he later
explains that it is “tacit consent” in the representative democracy.29
To make Locke’s theory viable, one commentator concluded that
the idea of consent must be replaced with “just compensation.”30 In
any event, the influence of Locke’s emphasis on private property is
evident in the Framers’ efforts to protect this individual right
through the Bill of Rights.31
26. Id. para. 138. To some degree, Locke thought that this power to prevent a taking
without consent is the very essence of property: “[Individuals] have such right to the goods
which by the law of the community are theirs, that nobody has a right to take their substance
or any part of it from them without their own consent; without this, they have no property at
all . . . .” Id.
27. Id. Locke explains:
[F]or the preservation of property being the end of government and that for which
men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the people should
have property; without which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering into
society, which was the end for which they entered into it—too gross an absurdity for
any man to own.
Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. para. 164.
30. See EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 14–15 (“The categorical command that property
shall not be taken without tacit consent must therefore be rewritten to provide that property
may be taken upon provision of just compensation.”).
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 7–18. Professor
Epstein discusses in detail the influence that the modern philosophers Thomas Hobbes and
John Locke had on the Constitution’s formation. In reference to Locke’s influence, Epstein
writes:
The Lockean system was dominant at the time when the Constitution was adopted.
His theory of the state was adopted in Blackstone’s Commentaries, and the
protection of property against its enemies was a central and recurrent feature of the
political thought of the day. Although protection of private property was a central
objective of the original constitutional scheme, the Constitution was not one
eminent domain clause writ large . . . . At every turn the constitutional concern is
with preventing the concentration of power in a few hands . . . . Within the
[Constitution’s] original framework the rich array of procedural and jurisdictional
protections was expected to serve some substantive end. And that end was, of
course, the protection of private property, of “lives, liberties, and estates” that Locke
considered the purpose of government. The procedural safeguards worked to
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Today, every level of government in the United States may
exercise the right of eminent domain: from the federal government,
to states, to counties, to cities, and even to local government
subdivisions.32 As noted, this right inheres in the sovereign’s power,
so it should come as no surprise that there is no mention of the
eminent domain right in the original articles of the United States
Constitution and no clear expression of it in any of the
Constitution’s amendments. In fact, the federal government’s
eminent domain right was not explicitly recognized by a branch of
the government until the Supreme Court decided Kohl v. United
States33 in 1875. True, the eminent domain right is implied by the
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, but this recognition came as a
protection of an individual liberty, rather than as a grant of
governmental power. The source of the eminent domain right is
sovereignty.
The Fifth Amendment’s language—“nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation” 34— dictates two
limitations on exercising the eminent domain right. First, the “public
use” limitation prohibits the federal government from taking land for
any private advantage. It is a term that courts today interpret very
broadly, permitting an array of government objectives under the
cover of eminent domain exercise.35 The second limitation, which is

guarantee by indirection that the government would not pass laws that encroached
upon the property rights that government was designed to protect.
Id. at 16–17 (citations omitted). Focusing on the Bill of Rights, Epstein continues:
The Bill [of Rights] identifies the ends of government, the rights that the system of
limited jurisdiction, indirect voting, and separation of powers is designed to protect.
Here the brute fact of federalism complicates the application of political theory, for
the Bill of Rights functioned originally as a limitation upon the federal government
and not upon the power of the states, a point which was explicitly and correctly held
by Justice Marshall for a unanimous court in Barron v. Baltimore. Limitations upon
the powers of the state have been answered in practice by incorporating specific
protections for individuals against the state as well, including the eminent domain
clause.
Id. at 18 (footnotes omitted).
32. See Searles, supra note 18, at 336.
33. 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875) (“Such an authority [to appropriate land or other property
in the states] is essential to [the federal government’s] independent existence and
perpetuity . . . . The powers vested by the Constitution in the general government demand for
their exercise the acquisition of lands in all the States.”).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
35. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (holding that a
Hawaii statute breaking up large land holdings held in trusts was a permissible taking for
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the subject of this Comment, is “just compensation,” and it requires
the government to pay the landowner a fair amount for any taking.36
While the eminent domain right is of ancient origin, the
requirement of just compensation is a more recent historical
development.37 In fact, as late as the Civil War years, some state
governments were exercising their eminent domain right without
paying compensation.38 The Fifth Amendment’s private property
protections, which include the just compensation requirement, have
now long applied to all the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, as
incorporated by Supreme Court case law.39 Additionally, each state
has its own constitutional or statutory eminent domain laws that
similarly limit state and local government exercise of the eminent
domain right.40 All government must compensate landowners when
taking land.
Hence, the landowner-friendly compensation principle tempers
the otherwise harsh power of the government to take an individual’s
private property. Importantly, the U.S. Constitution and many of
the state constitutions include the words “just” or “due” with the
term “compensation.”41 Some commentators assert that the word is
superfluous,42 but others, including courts, indicate that the term
“public use”); see also Searles, supra note 18, at 342.
36. The brief “public use” discussion in this paragraph only fills out the background
section of the Comment. The focus of this Comment is whether valuation date statutes deny
just compensation, so “just compensation” necessarily receives more attention.
37. See EATON, supra note 6, at 14 (“Many early definitions of eminent domain,
including those applied in the United States, did not include a provision for just
compensation.”). The idea of just compensation appeared in the writings of Grotius in
connection with his expression of the eminent domain right. See GROTIUS, supra note 22, at
403 (“[T]he state is bound to make good out of the public funds the damage to those who
have lost what was theirs . . . .”); Searles, supra note 18, at 335.
38. See EATON, supra note 6, at 14; see also Lindsay v. Comm’rs, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38
(1796); State v. Dawson, 21 S.C.L. (3 Hill) 100 (1836).
39. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 405 (1994); Chi., Burlington & Quincy
R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897).
40. See Searles, supra note 18, at 335–36.
41. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 15 (“just compensation”);
IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 18 (“just compensation”); KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 4 (“full
compensation”); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 2d (“equivalent in money”); see also EATON, supra
note 6, at 16 (“Terms such as adequate, reasonable, and due are used in some constitutions in
conjunction with compensation.”).
42. See RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 223, at 205–06 (“The word [sic] ‘just,’ ‘full,’
‘adequate,’ ‘due,’ or ‘reasonable,’ prefixed to ‘compensation’ in constitution or statute, does
not carry any definite weight. None of these prefixes can enlarge or restrict the definition of
property, nor affect the measure of compensation.”); EATON, supra note 6, at 16.
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“just compensation” shows that compensation must ultimately be
fair for both the landowner and the government.43 Whatever the
term “just” adds or does not add to “compensation,” “just
compensation” may be defined as paying the property owner the
value—normally the fair market value on the date of valuation—of
the taken property. The compensation must be paid in money,44 and
it must include interest for any delay in making payment.45 The “fair
market value” of a property is “what a willing buyer would pay in
cash to a willing seller” at the time of valuation.46
The policy of just compensation is to put the property owner in
as good a position as he or she would have occupied if the taking
had not occurred.47 Thus, the government must spread the
individual landowner’s loss throughout the community, rather than
force the landowner to contribute more than his or her proper share
to the public improvement.48 At a more fundamental level, two
interests support the “same position” policy: fairness and respect for
43. See, e.g., Searles, supra note 18, at 343 (citing Searl v. Sch. Dist. Number 2 in Lake
County, 133 U.S. 553 (1890)); Utah State Rd. Comm’n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 830 n.8
(Utah 1984).
44. See Searles, supra note 18, at 343.
45. See id. (citing Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933)).
46. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (citation omitted).
The Court went on to explain that the “fair market value” standard of just compensation does
not generally account for the value an individual owner may place on property, but it is
nevertheless an administratively necessary standard:
We have acknowledged that, in some cases, this standard fails fully to indemnify the
owner for his loss. Particularly when property has some special value to its owner
because of its adaptability to his particular use, the fair-market-value measure does
not make the owner whole. We are willing to tolerate such occasional inequity
because of the difficulty of assessing the value an individual places upon a particular
piece of property and because of the need for a clear, easily administrable rule
governing the measure of “just compensation.”
Id. at 10 n.15. (citations omitted).
47. See Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 10; see also Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United
States, 148 U.S. 312, 336–37 (1893).
48. See Saratoga Fire Prot. Dist. v. Hackett, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 701 (Ct. App.
2002) (quoting L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Continental Dev. Corp., 66 Cal. Rptr.
2d 630, 644 (1997) and interpreting the just compensation provision of the California
Constitution). Distributing the loss “throughout the community” entails drawing on public
funds that the government has already collected or will collect through taxation or other
assessment.
Notably, a condemned property’s value may decrease based merely on the
announcement of the condemnation action. See 5 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 18.16 (3d ed.
2001); infra note 95. This depreciated value cannot be the compensation provided to the
owner if the “same position” policy is to be maintained.
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private property. Some courts have explicitly relied on the interest of
fairness to hold that a government entity cannot require a landowner
to surrender property, particularly property on which he or she lives,
without compensating the owner for the loss. 49 Furthermore, the
United States has a rich heritage of private property ownership,
inspired in many ways by the writings of John Locke, 50 so even if the
Constitution did not require compensation, courts would likely
enforce this historical respect for property by requiring
compensation.
Every state today recognizes the principle of just compensation
and by some means guarantees it to owners who must surrender
their property to a condemnor51 for a public use.52 Importantly, and
without question, the federal Constitution is controlling in all
jurisdictions. While states may formulate and adopt their own
procedures for condemnation actions—and all do—the
constitutional mandate that just compensation be provided must
obtain in every case. Unfortunately, state laws vary as to their
application of the just compensation principle, and not all of them
clearly abide by the Constitution’s compensation mandate.
Specifically, before a condemnor can award just compensation, it
must properly determine the compensation amount, which requires
setting a date of valuation.53 Many states set the valuation date by

49. See, e.g., Utah State Rd. Comm’n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984) (“The
constitutional requirement of just compensation derives ‘as much content from the basic
equitable principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of property law . . . .’”).
In the spirit of fairness, some states go beyond the just compensation requirement by
devoting code sections to requiring condemning authorities to assist with moving landowners
displaced by a condemnation proceeding. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4622 (1995); CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 7262 (1995); 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1-601A (1997). But see 4A SACKMAN, supra note
14, § 14A.02[4][c].
50. See supra notes 24–31 and accompanying text.
51. Governments may delegate their eminent domain right, and they often do. For
example, entities such as utilities companies frequently exercise the delegated eminent domain
right. See Searles, supra note 18, at 336. From this point forward, I will refer to the
condemning entity as “condemnor,” rather than “government,” since the condemnor might
not be a government entity. The requirement of just compensation is the same whether the
condemnor is a government entity or a corporation exercising delegated power.
52. See 3 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 8.01 n.14 (listing cases from each of the fifty states
that adopt the compensation requirement); Searles, supra note 18, at 335–36; see also EATON,
supra note 6, at 546–48 (chart listing the eminent domain constitutional provisions from each
state constitution).
53. The need for state governments to determine a time of valuation is not novel. See
RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 285, at 262.
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statute, and, perhaps not surprisingly, there are nearly as many
methods for setting the valuation date as there are states that have
created legislation on the topic.
B. Date of Valuation Statutes
1. State provisions
Historically, most courts identified the date of taking as the date
of valuation.54 The rationale behind using this date was that the land
should be valued at the time that the landowner was entitled to
receive compensation—that is, at the time that the landowner gave
up his or her rights to it.55 However, where state condemnation
procedures do not permit the condemnor to take until after a trier of
fact56 assesses compensation, it is clear that the valuation date cannot
54. See id. (citing a series of nineteenth century cases holding that the date of valuation
is the date of taking, including Tex. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Cella, 42 Ark. 528 (1884);
Lafayette, Muncie & Bloomington R.R. Co. v. Murdock, 68 Ind. 137 (1879); Chi., Kan. &
Neb. Ry. Co. v. Broquet, 28 P. 717 (Kan. 1892); Cobb v. City of Boston, 109 Mass. 438
(1872); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hays, 18 N.W. 51 (Neb. 1883); Stafford v. City of Providence,
10 R.I. 567 (1873); Tex. & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 60 Tex. 215 (1883)).
55. See 3 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 8.05; 11A MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 32.97,
at 153. An early Massachusetts court opined:
The true rule would be, as in the case of other purchases, that the price is due and
ought to be paid, at the moment the purchase is made, when credit is not specially
agreed on. And if a . . . court could be called on the instant and on the spot, the
true rule of justice for the public would be, to pay the compensation with one hand,
whilst they apply the axe with the other; and this rule is departed from only because
some time is necessary, by the forms of law, to conduct the inquiry; and this delay
must be compensated by interest. But in other respects the damages must be
appraised upon the same rule, as they would have been on the day of the taking.
Parks v. City of Boston, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 198, 208–09 (1834).
Admittedly, a significant problem arises when setting the valuation date at the date of
taking, for there is debate about when a taking actually occurs. Some states set the date of
taking at the time of trial even though the condemnor might not have taken possession or
received title at that time. See 5 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 18.16
(3d ed. 2001). Presumably, this convention arose in states that set the date of valuation at the
date of taking while permitting or requiring a compensation determination before title passed
to the condemnor. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.660(2) (Michie 1992); VA. CODE
ANN. § 25-46.3 (Michie 2000). See Part III.B for a more detailed discussion of the taking date
problem.
56. The term “trier of fact” is necessarily broad. Nearly every state permits the parties in
a condemnation proceeding to try the issue of compensation before a court or jury. However,
twenty-six states require an initial determination by a board of commissioners. See 7 PATRICK J.
ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2A.03 tbl. II (2002). These
states are Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
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be the date of taking. Some courts have reacted to this procedural
difficulty by determining a valuation date earlier in time than the
taking date.57 State legislatures have also responded by adopting
statutes that set the date of valuation, many of them mimicking the
court-created standards.58
The valuation date statutes of the several states are varied in both
clarity and in the standards they adopt.59 A few states have code
sections specifically devoted to setting the date of valuation,60 while
others bury valuation date standards in codes that govern eminent
domain procedure generally.61 Twenty-one states and the District of
Columbia have no valuation date statute, even though all states and
the district have fairly extensive eminent domain codes.62 This
deficiency may be no accident. For example, Alabama, which has
adopted the Uniform Eminent Domain Code (“UEDC”) nearly in
its entirety,63 has expressly refused to adopt the UEDC’s date of
valuation section.64 A date of valuation law is necessary, however, in
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Interestingly, in Kentucky, the commission is to be composed of
“three (3) impartial housekeepers of the county who are owners of land.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 416.580(1) (Michie 1992). Other states require some level of expertise from their
commissioners. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 6B.4 (West 2001) (providing for twenty-eight
commissioners in total, seven who own or operate agricultural property, seven who own city
property, seven who are licensed real estate salespersons or brokers, and seven who have special
property value knowledge because of their occupation).
57. See 3 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 8.05[2] nn.19–30 (listing cases from states that
have early valuation dates because of condemnation procedures that generally require
compensation assessment before taking).
58. For a list by jurisdiction of the cases that provide these standards, see 5 SACKMAN,
supra note 14, § 18.16 nn.1–21 (2001).
59. See infra app. (summarizing each state’s statutory treatment of valuation dates).
60. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130 (West 1982); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 101–124 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-103 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:330 (West 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-440 (Law. Co-op. 1991); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26703 (Michie 1997); see also infra app.
61. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 8.04.092, 8.12.190 (1992); WIS. STAT. §§ 32.09(1),
32.05(7)(c), 32.06(7) (1998); see also infra app.
62. See infra app. The states with no valuation date statute are Alabama, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont, and West Virginia. See infra app.
63. See THEODORE J. NOVAK ET AL., CONDEMNATION OF PROPERTY: PRACTICE AND
STRATEGIES FOR WINNING JUST COMPENSATION § 16.3, at 131 (1994).
64. See ALA. CODE § 18-1A-170 commentary (1997) (“The ‘compensation standard’
under the UEDC [(Uniform Eminent Domain Code)] is stated in UEDC Section 1002. That
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order to determine property value,65 so states like Alabama that have
no valuation date statute must rely—intentionally or unintentionally—on their common-law standards.
A few states have well-developed valuation date statutes.
California, for example, provides three methods of valuation in its
eminent domain code.66 First, unless there is an earlier appropriate
date, the valuation date is the date that the condemnor deposits
probable compensation with the court.67 Second, if there is to be a
trial on the issue of compensation, and the trial occurs within one
year of the condemnation proceeding’s commencement, then the
valuation date is the proceeding’s commencement date.68 Third,
unless the landowner has caused the delay, if the trial on
compensation begins after one year from the proceeding’s
commencement, then the valuation date is the date of the trial’s
commencement.69 So, in California, the valuation date may be (1)
the date of compensation deposit, (2) the date of proceeding
commencement, or (3) the date of trial commencement. New Jersey
also has a well-developed valuation date statute that provides
multiple valuation options: (1) the date that the condemnor
possesses the property, (2) the date that the condemnation
proceeding commences, or (3) the date that the condemnor’s action
“substantially affects the [condemnee’s] use and enjoyment of the
property.”70 Notably, New Jersey’s third “use and enjoyment”
provision affords a court considerable interpretative leeway to set the
valuation date at very early stages of a condemnation action.71

‘standard’ is the ‘fair market value determined . . . as of the date of valuation.’ UEDC Section
1002 has been omitted from this Code . . . . UEDC Section 1003 (Date of Valuation) also has
been omitted from this Code.”).
65. See 5 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 18.16 (citing United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S.
253 (1980); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S.
246 (1934)).
66. California’s eminent domain code sections are located at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 1230.010–1273.050 (West 1982). The sections that specifically deal with valuation date
determination are CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130.
67. Id. § 1263.110.
68. Id. § 1263.120.
69. Id. § 1263.130.
70. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-30 (West 1997). The statute mentions a fourth possible
date that applies only to abandoned property.
71. See, e.g., Township of W. Windsor v. Nierenberg, 695 A.2d 1344, 1358 (N.J. 1997)
(holding in a 4-3 decision that the date of a letter sent to the landowner, informing her that
her land might be condemned, was the effective date of valuation under N.J. STAT. ANN.
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Overall, twenty-nine states have a valuation date statute of some
kind. These various statutes describe a wide range of valuation dates,
such as the date of summons, the date of trial on compensation, the
date that the condemnation action begins,72 the date that the
condemnor deposits probable compensation, and the date that the
condemnor takes the land. The most common date of valuation is
the date of summons or service of summons. Alaska, Arizona,
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah use this date. Similarly,
Indiana values property on the service date of the “condemnation
notice.”73 Nevada’s valuation statute qualifies its summons date
provision by setting the valuation date at the date of trial when trial
begins more than two years after the first service of summons and
when either the condemnor or court backlog caused the delay.74 In
fact, setting the valuation date at the date that trial on compensation
commences is another common statutory option in the states.
California, Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Nevada, Texas, and Washington have provisions that might require
valuing at the trial date or at the date of a similar proceeding.75
Alternatively, California, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Virginia, and Wyoming may use the date that a
condemnor files or commences the condemnation action.76 Many
§ 20:3-30(c) (West 1997)).
72. A valuation date could even be before the condemnor commences action. See supra
note 71.
73. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.330 (Michie 2000) (issuance of summons); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 12-1123(A) (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 101-24 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 7-712
(Michie 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-1-9(g) (Michie 2002) (service of condemnation
notice); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-302 (2001) (service of summons); NEV. REV. STAT.
37.120(1) (2001) (service of summons); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-11 (1996); see also infra
app.
74. See NEV. REV. STAT. 37.120(1) (2001); see also infra app.
75. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 38-1-114(1) (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.071(2), 74.051 (West 1987); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 416.660(2) (Michie 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:9(A), :14, :153 (West 1979)
(applying the valuation date to partial takings where the condemnor is port authority, state
university, or state department of public works); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-103
(1996); NEV. REV. STAT. 37.120(1) (2001); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.042(b) (Vernon
2000) (time of special commissioners’ hearing); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 8.04.092, 8.12.190
(1992) (for condemnation actions by cities but not by the state); see also infra app. Some of
these states may only list trial commencement as one of several valuation date possibilities, the
application of which will depend upon the circumstances of particular cases. See infra note 79.
76. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130 (West 1982); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 5/7-121 (West 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.70, sec. 20(3) (West 1998);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-27-19 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-30 (West 1997) (date
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states have condemnation procedures that permit or require the
condemnor to deposit probable compensation with a court, and
some of these states may value the property on the date of deposit,
including California, Florida, and Louisiana.77 Five states use the
date of taking as the valuation date: Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
North Dakota, and Virginia.78 Seven states—California, Colorado,
Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, and Virginia—have
statutory schemes that provide multiple alternative valuation dates
depending on the circumstances of particular cases.79
There are a variety of less common statutory provisions. For
example, North Carolina sets the date of valuation at a time
“immediately prior” to the condemnation action commencement,80
and Pennsylvania probably requires a time “immediately before” the
actual taking.81 In similar fashion, Massachusetts establishes the
valuation date at a time before the recording of a taking order,82 and
Louisiana may, depending on the circumstances, value property at a

condemnation proceedings commenced is one of four options); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42A-124(A) (Michie 1994); see also id. § 42-2-15(A); VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.3 (Michie 2000)
(one of two options); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-703 (Michie 2001) (date condemnation action
commenced); see also infra app.
77. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130 (West 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 73.071(2), 74.051 (West 1987) (if landowner does not request a hearing); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19:9(A), :14, :153 (West 1979); see also infra app.
78. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.660(2) (Michie 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 19:9(A), :14, :153 (West 1979); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-103 (1996); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-15-23 (1996) (date of taking is the only statutory option); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 25-46.3 (2000); see also infra app. Even though each of these five states use the date of
taking as the effective valuation date, they may define the date of taking differently, resulting in
different valuation dates depending on the state. For a more detailed discussion of the
problems associated with the date of taking, see infra Part III.A.
79. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 38-1-114(1) (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.071(2), 74.051 (West 1987); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 416.660(2) (Michie 1992); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-103 (1996); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 20:3-30 (West 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.3 (Michie 2000); see also infra
app.
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-63 (2002); see also infra app.
81. See 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1-602(a) (1997); see also infra app. Pennsylvania’s code
does not clearly provide for valuation of a total taking. Section 1-602 directly applies to partial
takings and states that the landowner receives the value of the difference between the
property’s value before and after the taking. See id. § 1-602(a) (1997). A landowner in a total
taking has no property left to value after the taking, so the concern is with the property’s value
at (or “immediately before”) the time of taking. Hence, the statement in the text here is an
extrapolation from the statutory language.
82. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 12 (West 1993); see also infra app.
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time before the condemnor proposed the taking.83 In Colorado, if a
condemnor possesses the condemned property prior to a trial on
compensation, then the date of possession is the effective valuation
date.84 New Jersey has a similar time of possession provision.85
Somewhat surprisingly, only one state—Florida—describes the
possibility of valuation at the date that title actually passes to the
condemnor.86 Finally, Wisconsin’s statutory framework provides that
if the condemnation is for sewers or transportation, the valuation
date is the date of the compensation’s recording at the county
register’s office.87 Otherwise, Wisconsin sets that valuation date at
the date of filing of a lis pendens.88
2. The policy of valuation date statutes
Sound policy considerations have likely motivated state
legislatures to adopt date of valuation statutes. These policy
considerations at least include preventing the hazards of property
value fluctuations, increasing administrative efficiency, and providing
consistency and predictability. Ultimately, these considerations are
secondary to the policies that support the constitutional just
compensation mandate.89 Any statutory valuation scheme must not
deny the landowner just compensation for his or her taken property.
First, and perhaps most importantly, valuation date statutes
attempt to deal with property value fluctuations.90 Property values do
not remain constant over time,91 and indeed, they can change

83. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:9(A), :14, :153 (West 1979); see also infra app.
84. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-114(1) (2000); see also infra app.
85. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-30(a)–(d) (West 1997) (one of four options, the earliest
of which is the proper valuation date); see also infra app.
86. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.071(2), 74.051 (West 1987); see also infra app.
87. See WIS. STAT. §§ 32.09(1), 32.05(7)(c), 32.06(7) (1998).
88. See id.; see also infra app.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 47–50.
90. See, e.g., Saratoga Fire Prot. Dist. v. Hackett, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 701 (Ct. App.
2002) (“[T]he primary purpose of the Legislature in enacting section [1263.120, formerly
section 1249,] was to protect the parties against fluctuations in the market value of real
property.”).
91. See 3 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 8.05 (“The value of real estate is by no means
constant, and before compensation can be intelligently assessed for the taking of land by
eminent domain, a point of time must be fixed as of which the property is to be valued.”); see
also 5 id. § 18.16.
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drastically in a few weeks or months.92 Consequently, since triers of
fact in condemnation proceedings must determine value and award
just compensation, necessity demands a time of valuation. With a
definite valuation date, the trier of fact or the parties can retain
appraisers and begin the sometimes laborious and often timeconsuming process of property valuation.93 There is, however, a
deeper justification than necessity: Date of valuation statutes protect
both parties in a condemnation proceeding from value fluctuations.
Condemnors will not have to pay more compensation if the value
increases before the trier determines the compensation amount,94
and the condemnees will not have to receive less compensation if
their land values decrease.95 Conversely, condemnors cannot take
advantage of value depreciations, and condemnees may not benefit
96
from value increases. In the case of depreciation, the condemnors’
own actions often cause the decrease in land value.97 Ultimately, the

92. See, e.g., Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701 (property value increased sixty
percent, from $2 million to $3.2 million, in a ten month period).
93. For a detailed summary of the appraisal process, see EATON, supra note 6.
94. See, e.g., Utah State Rd. Comm’n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 830 n.8 (Utah 1984)
(“A publicly announced general plan of area-wide condemnation may have the effect of
artificially increasing the value of properties not initially included in the area to be condemned
before judicial proceedings have been commenced, thereby resulting in a windfall to the
landowner . . . . Although the constitutional guarantee of just compensation protects private
property owners and not the State, our interpretation of [Utah’s valuation date statute] . . .
allows an appropriate adjustment in the date of valuation to be made to protect the State
against having to pay an award of compensation unfair to it.”); Casino Reinvestment Dev.
Auth. v. Hauck, 722 A.2d 949, 952 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (“‘The statute is also
designed to insulate the condemnor from the ravages of an inflationary spiral’ resulting from
the anticipation of a governmental taking.”).
95. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Kacmarik, 177 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
1961) (“As houses begin to come down, tenants in nearby homes move out, the
neighborhood deteriorates or is deserted, vandalism often sets in, appearances and values
depreciate with the result that frequently the property owner is greatly handicapped in
presenting his case to the jury by the time his land gets into court.”); Hauck, 722 A.2d at 952
(“The object of [New Jersey’s valuation date law] is thus ‘to protect the condemnee from a
decrease in the value of its property which is attributable to the cloud of condemnation’ caused
by the acts of the condemnor.”).
96. Value increases that could benefit the condemnee may be at issue if the actual taking
occurs after value determination. See, e.g., Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696; see also infra
Part III.B.2. Consequently, the landowner might receive this benefit to satisfy the demands of
the just compensation principle.
97. See Kacmarik, 177 N.E.2d at 813; State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 828 (Alaska
1976) (reasoning that the policy underlying a valuation date set at the date of summons
issuance was to prevent the state from taking advantage of the drop in property values that
occurs when the state condemns property). Interestingly, at least one state has attempted to
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interest in protecting the landowner from land value depreciation
outweighs the apparent loss to the condemnor.
Valuation date statutes also afford the governing body some
degree of administrative efficiency.98 When the date is set, courts or
hearing commissions can avoid argument on what the proper date is
and focus instead on determining value. Furthermore, parties can
move forward with collection of evidence to demonstrate value as of
the set date, and the proceeding can move forward and terminate
without a burdensome, continual updating of the valuation evidence.
Importantly, legislatures probably imagined that the condemnation
actions would proceed quickly.99 Valuation date laws theoretically
streamline the process and encourage it to end before land values can
change much.100
Valuation date statutes also attempt to provide consistency and
predictability. With a clearly established valuation date, the triers of
fact and the parties to condemnation actions can determine the
appropriate valuation date and develop reasonable expectations
about the required evidence and the ultimate result. Also,
condemnors will know in advance of a condemnation action how the
property will be valued, and knowing this information may affect the
decision to take the property. Notably, consistency and predictability
are not always the rule since just compensation is the overriding
principle in value determinations. A trier of fact might apply a
valuation date that is different than the statutorily created date in
order to meet the constitutional mandate, though a properly drafted
statute could avoid a trier’s need to disregard statutory language.101
deal with condemnor-caused valuation changes by statute. See 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1-604
(1997) (“Any change in the fair market value prior to the date of condemnation which the
condemnor or condemnee establishes was substantially due to the general knowledge of the
imminence of condemnation . . . shall be disregarded in determining fair market value.”).
98. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 n.15 (1984).
99. See, e.g., Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700 (“The purpose of our eminent
domain statutes is obvious. The Legislature undoubtedly envisioned speedy acquisitions and
timely compensation.”).
100. See id.
101. That courts occasionally disregard valuation date statutes to provide just
compensation goes to the heart of the problem this Comment discusses. See infra Part III.B;
see also Mayor of Balt. v. Kelso Corp., 380 A.2d 216 (Md. 1977) (holding that the valuation
date cannot be applied to deprive a property owner of the just compensation he or she is
entitled to receive under the Maryland Constitution). But see Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth.
v. Hauck, 722 A.2d 949 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (rigidly applying the date of
valuation law).
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III. THE DATE OF VALUATION DILEMMA

The date of valuation dilemma is simply explained. Condemnees
are entitled to the value of their taken property when they are forced
to surrender all rights to use, enjoy, and possess it.102 Valuation date
statutes often set the valuation date at a time earlier than the time
condemnees surrender103 these rights. If the property value increases
materially between the date of valuation and the time that
condemnees actually relinquish their rights, then application of the
date of valuation statute denies just compensation.104 A court with
jurisdiction over the condemnation matter must decide between
enforcing the valuation date law or upholding the principle of just
compensation.
Although articulating the date of valuation dilemma is simple,
resolving it is not. The explication and resolution of the dilemma lies
on two levels. First, the condemnee is entitled to compensation at
the time that he or she last had rights to his or her property, which is
at the time of taking (or immediately before the taking), but it is not
clear what qualifies as a taking. Consequently, it is difficult to
determine the time a taking occurred and the concurrent surrender
of property rights by the condemnee. Second, assuming the time of
taking is established, a court overseeing a condemnation matter must
102. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also 3 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 8.05
(The value of property taken by eminent domain “is determined as of the time that the owner
is entitled to receive.”). Effectively, the landowner’s surrender of rights occurs at the time of
taking. See infra Part III.A.
There are those who have argued that the taking occurs prior to the landowner’s
surrender of legal property rights. In Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. at
13, the Supreme Court framed the argument: “The filing of a complaint in condemnation and
a notice of lis pendens . . . has the effect of preventing the owner of unimproved land thereafter
from making any profitable use of it, or of selling it to another private party.” The Court
rejected the argument under the case’s particular facts and reasoned that “[u]ntil title passed to
the United States, [the landowner] was free to make whatever use it pleased of its property.”
Id. at 15.
103. Use of the term “surrender” here does not also imply the power of the condemnee
to refuse to give up the rights. When the government takes land for a legitimate public use, the
condemnee cannot refuse. He or she is, however, entitled to just compensation for the taking.
In County of Dona Ana v. Bennett, 867 P.2d 1160, 1164 (N.M. 1994), the court states that
property should be valued at the time that the condemnee “loses control” over the property,
which is perhaps more precise terminology.
104. Importantly, the date of valuation dilemma is not about paying interest on a
compensation award. Post-judgment interest compensates a condemnee for the lost value of
money. The date of valuation dilemma instead focuses on a land value change between the
valuation date and the actual taking.
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still determine how that taking date is useful for providing the
landowner just compensation. For example, suppose in a particular
jurisdiction that there is an accepted court rule or legislative mandate
that a taking occurs when the condemnor possesses the property,
dispossessing the condemnee. Assume that in a condemnation action
the possession actually occurs several months after a trial on
compensation, and the taken land’s value increases significantly
between trial and actual possession.105 The date of valuation is a
separate determination from the date of taking, so if the legislature
has also ruled that the summons date or the trial date is the date of
valuation, then the condemnee will not receive just compensation if
the statute is applied.
This very problem has arisen in a surprising number of cases.106
Furthermore, it has the potential to arise again because the valuation
date laws in the several states establish valuation dates at various
times, apparently without considering the condemnee’s surrender of
property rights as a factor in determining the valuation date.107
Courts in states that have laws permitting a valuation date at a time
different than the time that the condemnee actually surrenders
property rights can encounter the date of valuation dilemma. In the
following discussion, section A deals with the first level of the
valuation date problem by examining the related date of taking
problem. Section B discusses leading judicial responses to the
valuation date dilemma.
A. The Related Date of Taking Problem
The date of valuation always stands in relation to the date of
taking. There can be important effects on valuation date analysis
depending on whether the taking occurs before or after the
condemnor provides compensation.108 Some states require that

105. This hypothetical situation is similar to the factual situation described in Saratoga
Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697–98, except that in Saratoga Fire the condemnor had not yet
taken possession while the property value had increased significantly from the date of valuation.
See infra Part III.B.2.
106. See infra Part III.B.
107. In these states, the legislatures appear to have focused more on relieving
administrative burdens and dealing with other policy considerations than on the substantive
question of when a taking actually occurs. See supra Part II.B.2.
108. See 11A MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 32.97.
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compensation occur before the taking,109 and this requirement raises
obvious concerns about when to value the property: a property
cannot be valued at taking if it cannot be taken until valued. In order
to meet the just compensation requirement, states in this category
may have to adjust their standards and either value property at the
time of taking or permit adjustment of the compensation amount
after a trial on compensation.
At first glance, the question of when a taking occurs may be
simply answered by reference to the time that the government
actually takes the land; however, it is not clear when this action
occurs. It may be that the government takes when it physically
possesses the property. Or, the taking may occur when the
government begins the condemnation proceeding. Alternatively, the
government may effectively take the land when it merely decides or
proposes to exercise its eminent domain right. There is no consensus
among the states.110
Before dealing with the factors that mark the taking date, it is
important to understand the procedures that governments generally
use to take property by eminent domain. While each state has
somewhat different procedures, the federal approach provides a good
overview of the basic law.111 Under the United States Code, the
government has at least three methods for exercising its eminent
domain right: (1) straight condemnation, (2) “quick take,” and (3)
legislative taking.112 A fourth, less common method is the taking by
oust, which is not mentioned in the United States Code.113
The “straight condemnation” method is described in 40 U.S.C.
§ 3113.114 This procedure permits an authorized officer of the
federal government to apply to the Attorney General, who in turn

109. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-5 (1982); IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 18; KAN. CONST.
art. 12, § 4.
110. See 11A MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 32.97 (“[T]here is an apparent conflict in
the authorities as to the time from which compensation is to be computed, due in part to
differing ideas as to what constitutes a ‘taking . . . .’”).
111. For a more detailed discussion of each state’s basic eminent domain procedure (with
the exception of Maine, whose eminent domain procedure is scattered throughout its code),
see 7 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 56, § 2A.03[1]–[51].
112. See 40 U.S.C. §§ 3113–3114 (2002); FED. R. CIV. P. 71A.
113. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 5 (1984).
114. See also Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 4 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 257, which was replaced by
§ 3113 in 2002).
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may initiate the condemnation proceedings.115 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 71A governs this proceeding.116 The district court may
appoint a commission to determine the property’s value, and
following that determination, the government may either
compensate the landowner that amount and take the land or seek
dismissal of the condemnation action.117
The United States Code also provides for a “quick-take”
procedure similar to procedures developed in various states.118
Section 3114 of 40 U.S.C. permits the condemning governmental
entity to file a “declaration of taking” before judgment in the
condemnation action.119 This declaration states that the government
takes the property pursuant to the declaration. Hence, the taking
occurs at the time of the declaration.120 The government must
deposit estimated compensation into the court at that time, and title
and right to the land vest concurrent with the deposit.121 Subsequent
judicial proceedings may still determine the appropriate amount of
compensation, but the government is henceforth in possession of the
property.122
Two other methods of taking are the legislative taking and the
oust. First, the federal government may exercise its eminent domain
right by legislative enactment.123 The legislation that effects the
taking will also provide a special procedure for determining
compensation after the taking occurs.124 Second, with oust, the
government expropriates privately owned property, not by any
statutorily authorized procedure, but by physically entering the
property and ousting the owner.125 The owner has a right to bring a

115. 40 U.S.C. § 3113.
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 71A.
117. 40 U.S.C. § 3114.
118. See id. For examples of state “quick take” procedures, see ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.55.440 (Michie 2000); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.410 (West 1982); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/7-103 (West 1992).
119. 40 U.S.C. § 3114.
120. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1984).
121. 40 U.S.C. § 3114; see also Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 4–5.
122. See Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 5.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. (citing United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 747–49 (1947)).
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suit, known as an inverse condemnation suit,126 to recover the value
of the land on the date of the oust, which is the date of taking.127
Quick takes, legislative takings, and ousts present the least
analytical concern in determining when the taking occurs. It occurs
when there is a judicial order accompanied by a deposit of
compensation, a legislative enactment, or a physical entry and
assertion of ownership. Straight condemnation is more enigmatic
because three distinct events could be considered the taking. First,
the taking may be said to occur at the time of physical possession
where, similar to an oust, the government officially takes the land
when it moves its agents onto the property and begins the intended
project. Second, the taking may occur at the time that the
government compensates the condemnee. Finally, the taking could
occur when the title vests in the condemnor, which may be either
when the government pays compensation (either to the condemnee
or as a deposit into the court) or when a judicial or administrative
order vests title. Any one of these options alone probably constitutes
the time that the government takes the property since at any one of
these events the condemnee surrenders legal right to the land.
Courts and legislatures have not always clearly responded to the
takings date problem. The United States Supreme Court offered a
rule in Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States,128 but in doing
so, the Court appeared to equivocate. The majority first held that
“[u]nless a taking has occurred previously in actuality or by a
statutory provision . . . , we are of the view that the taking in a
condemnation suit . . . takes place upon the payment of the money
award by the condemnor.”129 Later, the Court reasoned that at the
time of trial, which is when compensation must be determined, “no
one knows when the United States will exercise its option to
purchase the property, so adoption of the date of payment as the
date of valuation is infeasible.”130 The Court’s holding is not entirely
126. Inverse condemnation suits are so called because the owner, who is normally the
defendant in a condemnation action, is the plaintiff in these kinds of suits.
127. Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 5 (citing United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21–22
(1958)).
128. 467 U.S. 1.
129. Id. at 11 (citing Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939)).
130. Id. at 16–17. Admittedly, the first statement, cited supra note 129, deals directly
with the time compensation is paid as the date of taking, whereas the statement quoted in this
sentence deals directly with the date of valuation. However the two dates, as already
demonstrated, are closely related: “[I]t should be apparent that identification of the time a
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unhelpful, for a landowner surrenders legal right to taken property
when the condemnor pays compensation. The most useful rule,
however, would have included other date of taking options, such as the
date of possession or the date title legally vests in the condemnor.131
Outside the Supreme Court, some states have dealt with the ambiguity
of the taking date by state court judicial rules that set the taking date at
the date of proceeding commencement.132 Such rulings settle the
takings date question (perhaps arbitrarily), but they still give rise to the
date of valuation dilemma if the takings date is not also the time that
condemnees surrender their property rights. In other states, legislatures
seek to overcome the need for such judicial rulings by statutorily
assigning the date of taking.133 Ultimately, however, the takings date is
the date that the condemnee must surrender legal right to the property,
and any takings date determination must depend on when this
relinquishment of rights occurs.
B. Leading Judicial Responses
Courts have responded to the date of valuation dilemma in
various ways. In dealing with specific valuation date statutes, state

taking of a tract of land occurs is crucial to determination of the amount of
compensation . . . .” Id. at 11.
The Court also approached the question of when a taking occurs in United States v.
Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958), and ruled that the takings date was the date that the government
entered the property. See id. at 24 (“[I]f the value of the property changed between the time
the Government took possession and the time of filing, payment as of the latter date would not
be an accurate reflection of the value of what the property owner gave up and the Government
acquired.”). In Dow, however, the government had entered the property three years before
filing the condemnation action for purposes of determining just compensation. Id. at 18. If, in
the alternative, the government entry did not occur for a period of time after the
compensation proceeding, then the Court would likely determine an earlier takings date. The
earlier date would be a time at which the condemnee surrendered all rights to the property,
such as at the time that the government paid compensation or otherwise acquired legal title. In
any event, the latest a taking could occur would be when the government enters the land. See
id. at 23–24.
131. As noted in the previous paragraph, a condemnee surrenders his or her property
rights (1) at the time of condemnor possession, (2) at the time of compensation, or (3) at the
time title vests in the condemnor.
132. See, e.g., Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 859 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ariz. 1993)
(proceeding commencement); W. Va. Dep’t of Highways v. Roda, 352 S.E.2d 134, 138–39
(W. Va. 1986) (date of taking is the date of proceeding commencement).
133. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.660(2) (Michie 1992) (“The taking date for
valuation purposes shall be either the date the condemnor takes the land, or the date of the
trial of the issue of just compensation, whichever comes first.”).

288

BAU-FIN

265]

2/15/2003 3:43 PM

When Date of Valuation Statutes Deny

courts have been faced with four options: (1) rule that the statute
was unconstitutional or that a particular application of it was
unconstitutional, (2) alter the date of valuation and rule that altering
it falls within the meaning of the statute, (3) rigorously apply the
statute, or (4) ignore the valuation date law and use a different
standard. The following discussion briefly reviews the Supreme
Court’s Kirby Forest decision134—which did not deal with a specific
valuation date law but did offer valuable insight into how the Court
might rule if faced with the valuation date dilemma—and four other
cases that demonstrate how several jurisdictions have, in sometimes
surprising ways, resolved the valuation date dilemma.
1. The Supreme Court’s decision
The Kirby Forest case arguably settled the date of valuation
problem eighteen years ago. The primary question that the Court
dealt with was not what the date of valuation should have been, but
what the date of taking was and whether interest could be computed
from that date.135 The date of the taking, the Court concluded, was
the date that the government paid the landowner for the property.136
This response has an obvious impact on property valuation, but the
Court’s most important insights on the valuation date dilemma
emerge in its analysis of the interest question. The Court reasoned
that, notwithstanding any interest award, if designating a date other
than the date of payment as the valuation date “provide[s] the owner
substantially less than the fair market value of his property on the
date the United States tenders payment, it violates the Fifth
Amendment.”137 The facts of Kirby Forest demonstrate that this
violating situation could easily arise.
In the Kirby Forest case, Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. (“Kirby
Forest”), a forest products manufacturer, owned about 2,000 acres
of forest land that the federal government wanted in order to create
Big Thicket National Preserve.138 In 1974,139 Congress enacted
134. 467 U.S. 1.
135. See id. at 9.
136. See id. at 11. But see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
137. Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 17.
138. See id. at 6–7.
139. Interestingly, the National Park Service conducted a study in 1967 that resulted in a
recommendation to create a 35,500 acre Big Thicket National Park in eastern Texas. See id. at
6. Kirby Forest’s 2,000 plus acres were part of the recommended national park. Id. In response
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legislation authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to acquire the
land pursuant to the straight condemnation procedures now
described in 40 U.S.C. § 3113.140 After negotiations to purchase the
land failed, the government instituted a condemnation action on
August 21, 1978, and the compensation trial began before a hearing
commission on March 6, 1979.141 The commission set compensation
at $2,331,202.142 Both parties objected, but on August 13, 1981, a
district judge entered judgment awarding the commission’s
compensation amount plus interest running from August 21, 1978,
which was the filing date of the condemnation action.143 The United
States finally made its payment of compensation on March 26, 1982,
three years after the date upon which the hearing commission valued
the property.144
Kirby Forest requested that the Court award interest for the time
period between the valuation date and the taking date, but the Court
declined, noting that changes in land market values “bear[] only a
tenuous relationship to the market rate of interest.”145 Instead of an
interest payment, the Court proposed a procedure for modifying the
compensation award “when there is a substantial delay between the
date of valuation and the date the judgment is paid, during which
time the value of the land changes materially.”146 Specifically dealing
with the litigants in Kirby Forest, the Court remanded the case for
consideration of the land’s value on the date that the government
paid compensation.147 Speaking generally, however, the Court
suggested that Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
offered a solution to condemnees who were denied just

to the National Park Service’s recommendation, the Texas Forestry Association issued a 1967
moratorium on all logging in the designated area. Id. So, when condemnation proceedings
finally commenced in 1979, Kirby Forest had already foregone logging on its own land for
twelve years. See id. at 6–7.
140. See id. at 7. At the time of the Kirby Forest case, the code section related to straight
condemnation procedures was located at 40 U.S.C. § 257.
141. See Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 7.
142. Id. at 8.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 17.
146. Id. at 17–18 (emphasis added).
147. See id. at 19. On the condition that the district court would consider such land value
evidence, the judgment of the court of appeals that the government owed Kirby Forest no
interest was affirmed. Id.
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compensation when the government failed to pay compensation (and
consequently did not take) until after a substantial period elapsed
from the date of valuation.148 Rule 60(b) permits a court to amend a
final order for “any . . . reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment.”149 Providing the constitutionally required just
compensation is unquestionably a reason that justifies relief from
judgment.
2. Leading state cases
In Saratoga Fire Protection District v. Hackett,150 a California
appellate court faced a constitutional challenge to California’s
valuation date statute. The Saratoga Fire Protection District (“the
District”) condemned the defendant’s office building to use as a
residence for firefighters, offices, and parking.151 The District,
pursuant to California’s eminent domain procedure, filed a
condemnation action on December 17, 1999.152 California’s
valuation date statute set this filing date as date of valuation for the
trial on compensation, and the parties stipulated that the property
was worth $2 million on that date.153 Before trial began on
November 13, 2000, the defendant obtained two more appraisals.
One, on October 5, 2000, valued the property at $3,049,412, and
the next, on October 12, 2000, revealed a fair market value of $3.2
million.154 The condemnee sought to introduce evidence of these
later appraisals during trial, and the District objected by motion. The
trial court reluctantly granted the motion, feeling bound by a history
of rigid application of the state’s valuation date law.155

148. See id. at 18.
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
150. 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (Ct. App. 2002).
151. Id. at 698.
152. See id.
153. See id.; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.120 (West 1982).
154. Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 698.
155. See id. at 698–99. As reported in the appellate court’s opinion, the trial judge stated:
I feel constrained to grant that motion [to exclude the October 2000 appraisal
evidence]. The statute is so clear; the history is so long. Some of the cases call this
settled law. I feel that I have to do that. Now, having said that, there seems to be
some unfairness here, to be candid, in this market with the way things are working.
And it certainly wouldn’t be unreasonable for the Legislature to revisit this in terms
of shortening the time period or changing the date of valuation under these
circumstances. Particularly strikes me as unfair that if there’s a loss, that the
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The Saratoga Fire court briefly mentioned each of California’s
three date of valuation methods, noting that the lower court
properly applied section 1263.120 since the trial began within one
year of the condemnation action’s filing date.156 However, the court
held that section 1263.120, as applied to the defendant in this case,
was both unjust and unconstitutional, and so it reversed the trial
court’s decision.157 The court reasoned that the policy underlying
just compensation, as required by both the federal and state
constitutions, was to make sure the landowner was not forced to
“contribute more than his proper share to the public
undertaking . . . [and] to distribute throughout the community the
loss inflicted upon the individual by the making of public
improvements.”158 Citing both the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Kirby Forest and a California Supreme Court decision, the
Saratoga Fire court reiterated that “any substantial increase in the
fair market value between the dates of valuation and taking must be
paid in order to provide ‘just compensation.’”159 Section 1263.120
was, like “all condemnation law, . . . but a means to the
constitutional end of just compensation,”160 and where the statute
failed to meet the constitutional mandate, the courts had to ensure
that the landowner received just compensation.161
Another leading valuation date case is County of Dona Ana v.
Bennett,162 in which the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld its
landowner bears the loss; but if there’s an appreciation in value, the landowner
doesn’t benefit from that . . . . But the law is the law, as I understand it, and I’m
granting your motion to exclude certain evidence . . . on that basis.
Id. at 699. Arguably, if there is a loss, the landowner does not bear it because the condemnor
takes the land that has depreciated in value. However, in California the condemnor can
abandon the taking for almost any reason for thirty days after filing the complaint, see CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1268.510 (West 1982), and it is not inconceivable that the condemnor
might do so if the land value significantly depreciated. See also Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 700 (“[U]nless the condemnor has done some additional act which would estop him, he can
abandon with near impunity.” (citing L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Trump Wilshire Assocs., 50
Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 233 (Ct. App. 1996))).
156. A more detailed description of California’s date of valuation statutes is located supra
notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
157. See Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
158. Id. at 701.
159. Id. at 702 (citing Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 17–18
(1984); Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore, 214 Cal. Rptr. 904, 911 n.9 (1985)).
160. Id. at 704 (citation omitted).
161. See id.
162. 867 P.2d 1160 (N.M. 1994).
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valuation date statute, but rejected a particular application of it as
unconstitutional.163 In Bennett, the Dona Ana County Board of
Commissioners (“the Board”) condemned a portion of the landowner’s property in order to make highway improvements.164 Using
the state’s “quick take” condemnation procedure,165 the Board
obtained an August 7, 1987, preliminary order to enter the property,
conditioned on the county’s deposit of just compensation with the
court.166 Subsequently, the county deposited the compensation
amount, entered the property in November 1987, and began work
on the highway improvements, removing nearly three thousand
cubic yards of soil in the process.167 The trial on compensation began
October 31, 1988, at which time the trial court entered an order
that made the August 7, 1987, preliminary order permanent as of
November 19, 1987.168 The court further disallowed any evidence
regarding the value of the removed soil and then instructed the jury
that November 19, 1987, was the takings date and the date of
valuation.169
New Mexico’s date of valuation statute sets the valuation date at
the date that the condemnor files a condemnation petition.170 The
court reasoned that this date of valuation was impermissible because
at the time that a condemnation petition is filed, there has not yet
been a taking.171 If the property’s value does not change between the
filing and the time that legal title vests in the condemnor, then there
is no harm in using the filing date as the valuation date.172
Alternatively, if the land’s value increases between those two dates,
then applying the statutory valuation date denies the landowner just
compensation.173 The statute, the court held, was in conflict with the
state constitution.174 Ultimately, the court held that the date that the
preliminary order became effective was the valuation date because
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id. at 1162.
See id.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-1 to -3 (Michie 1978).
See Bennett, 867 P.2d at 1162.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1162–63.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-15(A) (Michie 1978).
Bennett, 867 P.2d at 1164.
See id. at 1165.
Id.
Id. at 1164–65.
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the preliminary order “vest[ed] the condemnor with possession,
dominion, and control over the premises.”175 August 7, 1987, was
the proper date of valuation.176
The Utah Supreme Court encountered the valuation date
dilemma in Utah State Road Commission v. Friberg.177 Utah’s date of
valuation statute provides that the date of summons is the effective
date of valuation for condemned property.178 In Friberg, the
condemnees received summons for a condemnation action in June
1972; the state was taking their land in order to construct a
freeway.179 However, due in part to a separate legal battle over the
state’s right to build the freeway, the condemnees remained in
possession of the property until March 15, 1980.180 In the interim,
the land’s value appreciated significantly.181 The trial court eventually
ruled on December 12, 1979, that the state had the right to
condemn the property, but the court rigorously applied the valuation
date statute and set the valuation date at June 23, 1972.182 On
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court stated that it was “constrained to
construe [Utah’s valuation date statute] within the limitations of
constitutional requirements,” which demand just compensation.183
“When valuation is fixed at a date prior to the actual taking and the
value of the property increases during a prolonged condemnation
proceeding so that the valuation does not . . . constitute ‘just
compensation,’ the statue . . . is unconstitutional as applied.”184 As
with the opinions in Saratoga Fire and Bennett, the Friberg court
likely recognized the administrative necessity of the valuation date
statutes and only rejected applications that denied just compensation,
which is the governing principle in value determinations.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently examined the application of its date of valuation statute to a rather unique situation. In

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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Id. at 1164; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-6(A) (Michie 1978).
Bennett, 867 P.2d at 1165–66.
687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984).
Utah’s date of valuation statute is located at UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-11 (1996).
See Friberg, 687 P.2d at 825.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 829.
Id.
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Township of West Windsor v. Nierenberg,185 the court concluded that
the effective date of valuation was the date of a letter addressed to
the landowner indicating that the township might condemn her
land.186 The relevant New Jersey statute provided considerable room
for courts to set a valuation date at any time that the condemnor’s
actions “substantially affect[ed] the use and enjoyment of the
property by the condemnee.”187 Perhaps most remarkably, after
applying the rather loose statutory standard to find a date very early
in the condemnation process, the court concluded its decision with
an apparent attempt to pacify condemnors: “Condemnors are not
prejudiced by [the New Jersey valuation date statute] and, in fact,
may benefit from its application in instances where governmental
action precipitates a substantial increase in the value of the subject
property.”188 Of course, this “benefit” entails the precise problem
that this Comment addresses. Increases in land value before an actual
taking should accrue to the landowner as part of just compensation.
IV. DEALING WITH THE DILEMMA
Without much question, valuation date statutes give rise to
problems in providing condemnees just compensation. As noted,
courts are generally capable of responding to problems that arise,
particularly as they focus on meeting the constitutional just
compensation requirement. Despite the courts’ general aptitude,
however, a well-crafted statute can more directly resolve the date of
valuation dilemma by avoiding the dilemma in the first place.
Legislators who are drafting valuation date laws can anticipate
potential conflict and make statutory provisions that pre-empt the
conflict, thus providing consistent and predictable guidance for
judges and litigants.
Based on the analysis developed in Part III, a legislator must first
establish the time of taking. The time or date of taking will be the
earliest of (1) the time that the condemnor takes possession of the
property,189 (2) the time that the condemnor directly compensates

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

695 A.2d 1344 (N.J. 1997).
See id. at 1346–47.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-30(c) (West 1997).
Nierenberg, 695 A.2d at 1358.
See United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958).

295

BAU-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/15/2003 3:43 PM

[2003

the condemnee,190 or (3) the time that the title vests in the
condemnor through a judicial or administrative order.191 Each of
these times marks the final dissolution of the condemnee’s legal
interest or rights in the land. In theory, the divestment of interest
could occur as soon as the government thinks (metaphorically) “the
property is mine” because the government’s right of eminent
domain has no condition of action.192 In practicality, one of the three
above actions is probably necessary to establish the condemnor’s
ownership.
Importantly, the date of taking cannot occur before a time that
the government action is irrevocable. If the government can revoke
its decision to take, then it really has not taken the property yet.
Current statutory schemes, however, do not require irrevocability, as
detected by the Saratoga Fire court: “[U]nless the condemnor has
done some additional act which would estop him, he can abandon
with near impunity.”193 Worse, because of this right to abandon, the
condemnor may take advantage of all benefits while passing along
the loss in land value to the original condemnee.194 In effect, the
initiation of a condemnation proceeding would be illusory as the
condemnor could commence the proceedings, abandon the action as
land values become depressed in a recessionary market, and then
recommence the proceedings to take advantage of lower land
prices.195
Under ideal circumstances, just compensation would occur at the
time of taking and would be a complete and adequate compensation
for the property, valued in that instant.196 In other words, the date of
valuation should be the date of taking. Practically, though, value
determination takes time, and the parties must turn to the market
and to their appraisers in order to gather evidence that will persuade
190. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984).
191. See County of Dona Ana v. Bennett, 867 P.2d 1160, 1164 (N.M. 1994); see also
supra notes 128–33 and accompanying text.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 15–33.
193. See Saratoga Fire Prot. Dist. v. Hackett, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 700 (Ct. App.
2002) (quoting L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. V. Trump Wilshire Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 233
(Cal. App. 1996)).
194. See id. at 699; Township of W. Windsor v. Nierenberg, 695 A.2d 1344, 1358 (N.J.
1997).
195. The situation is somewhat analogous to illusory transfers as developed in the law of
wills and estates. See, e.g., Pezza v. Pezza, 690 A.2d 345, 348–49 (R.I. 1997).
196. See supra note 55.

296

BAU-FIN

265]

2/15/2003 3:43 PM

When Date of Valuation Statutes Deny

the trier of their valuation. So, even if the eventual valuation date is
the date of taking, as it should be, preliminary valuation dates may
be necessary for trial on compensation to go forward. Legislators can
avoid potentially arbitrary and inconsistent court rulings by
providing such dates in the date of valuation statute. States with
constitutions that require compensation before taking197 should be
particularly attentive to this issue and provide a preliminary valuation
date, as well as provisions to allow adjustment after the condemnor
pays compensation.198
In properly drafting valuation date laws, legislatures must also
deal with the possible effect of the government’s condemnation
announcement on property values. Since announcement alone often
affects the market value of condemned property,199 if the property is
valued at the time of taking, then that value includes the
announcement’s effect. The answer in drafting the law is that the
value must be adjusted for the announcement.200 The governing
principle is just compensation, and the policy is that the owner must
be put in the position he or she would have occupied had the taking
never occurred.201
Despite the value in establishing the valuation date at the time of
taking, competing rationales that motivated the previous date of
valuation determinations still exist. For example, some states have set
the valuation date at the date summons is issued. The rationale for
this determination probably runs to the very foundation of eminent
domain theory: a state’s right to take by eminent domain is inherent
in the state’s power, and it is only qualified by the public use and just
compensation limitations.202 The moment a state determines that it
needs property for public use, the property belongs to the state.

197. E.g., Georgia, Iowa, and Kansas. See supra note 109.
198. There could still be theoretical problems. The compensation could be adjusted after
the initial trial, but that would mean that the compensation process is not complete, and until
paid in full, there can be no taking. One can conceive of an endless cycle of valuation and revaluation with the taking never coming to fruition. Of course, in practicality, the adjustment
after initial compensation (to make the compensation “just”) would probably never be viewed
by a court as an unconstitutional compensation after taking.
199. See supra notes 94–97.
200. Appraisers are generally capable of making such an evaluation by valuing nearby
similar, but non-condemned, properties. For a discussion of appraiser considerations during
valuation, see EATON, supra note 6.
201. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
202. See supra Part II.A.
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Summons is a mere formality to inform the condemnee that the
property belongs to the government. Furthermore, the date of
summons marks at least one clear time to consider the property
taken. If the land does not yet “belong” to the government, it will,
and the only issue remaining is how much the government will
compensate the condemnee. The reason that rationales for early
valuation dates—like the date of summons, or of filing, or of trial—
are uncompelling is that they do not accurately reflect the
condemnee’s actual retention of concrete rights. The taking occurs,
and the property should be valued, when the condemnee surrenders
those rights.
In addition to clear valuation date statutes, state valuation date
laws need additional constitutional procedures, similar to those
articulated in the Kirby Forest case, that permit courts to alter a value
determination upon motion after the trial on compensation amount.
Perhaps reference to a Rule 60(b)-type procedure is adequate,
although a specific provision, tied directly to land value
determinations in condemnation proceedings, would remove doubt
as to how to proceed when land values shift dramatically between the
practical valuation date and the actual taking.
In addition to crafting new legislation, legislatures seeking to deal
with the valuation date dilemma have at least three other options: (1)
require the government to take before compensation, (2) make no
new legislation, and (3) modify existing laws. First, a legislature could
avoid the difficulty of setting a valuation date by requiring the
condemnor to always take before compensation. Most states already
have statutes that permit this procedure, usually known as a “quicktake.”203 The procedure avoids the difficulties of date valuation
because the property is valued at the time that the owner last had an
interest in it: the date of possession or taking. A difficulty with this
approach in some states is that their constitutions or statutory schemes
require compensation prior to taking.204 Aside from the constitutional
concerns, there are policy considerations. Even though the right of
eminent domain is inherent in the sovereign’s power, using the quicktake method with every taking might become politically unpopular,

203. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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especially in our modern society with a burgeoning population that
calls for more and more taking of land for public works.205
A legislature may also choose to make no changes to existing
statutory law. Courts have demonstrated that they will ignore the
date of valuation statutes when the statutes fail to provide just
compensation and enforce them when they do.206 The statutes will
continue to operate in the cases where there is little dispute as to
compensation, fulfilling their purpose to promote administrative
efficiency. Significantly, many cases that deal with the date of
valuation dilemma indicate that application of the relevant valuation
statute is intensively fact specific,207 so cases in which the valuation
date dilemma arises may require the fact-specific attention a judge or
jury can provide.
Legislatures may choose to retain their existing statutes and
amend them with provisions on how to deal with the valuation date
dilemma. California drafted a statute that attempted to prevent the
inadequate compensation that may occur when property values
fluctuate significantly between the valuation date (proceeding
commencement) and the date of taking.208 The statute moves the
valuation date to a later time if the compensation trial occurs more
than one year after the condemnation proceedings commence.209
However, this one-year, bright-line standard has since failed to
provide just compensation.210 The best approach is probably to
amend existing laws with the judge-articulated standards from Kirby:
The states’ old valuation date standards apply unless there is a
“substantial delay,” during which the land value “materially”
205. Congress may have had this concern in mind when drafting the 1974 legislation that
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to acquire east Texas forest lands for the Big Thicket
National Preserve. See Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 6–7. The Secretary was authorized to use the
“quick take” procedures under 40 U.S.C. § 258a only if necessary to protect land from
destruction. See id. at 7. Otherwise, Congress required the Secretary to use straight
condemnation procedures under 40 U.S.C. § 257, which initially involve negotiations for
purchase of “condemned” property. Id.
206. See supra Part III.B.1–2.
207. See generally Saratoga Fire Prot. Dist. v. Hackett, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (Ct. App.
2002); Utah State Rd. Comm’n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984); see also County of
Dona Ana v. Bennett, 867 P.2d 1160 (N.M. 1994). In fact, it seems that if the court mentions
the fact-specific nature of the question early in the decision, it is almost sure to rule against
applying the valuation date statute in that case.
208. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130 (West 1982).
209. See id.
210. See Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696.
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changes.211 If these conditions are met, then the material change in
value warrants altering any judgment based on a previous date of
valuation. Granted, permitting re-evaluation after the compensation
determination may promote delay due to the condemnee’s (or the
condemnor’s) attempt to stretch out an inflationary (or recessionary)
period, but the statute writers could include provisions about
defendant-caused delay.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Constitution and the various state constitutions require just compensation for landowners whose land is taken
by a condemning authority. Aside from a requirement that takings
be for public use, this just compensation requirement is the only
limitation on the government’s exercise of its eminent domain right.
Hence, any procedure that legislatures institute to govern eminent
domain must abide by this constitutional just compensation
principle.
Valuation date statutes are useful additions to state eminent
domain procedure codes. They permit the courts and hearing
commissions that handle condemnation actions to use fixed points in
time at which to value property. Settling on a time to appraise
condemned land avoids the uncertainty of ever-shifting land values,
and it eases the administrative burden of hearing evidence on when
the valuation date should be. However, these same valuation date
laws may be the source of constitutional violations. A landowner is
entitled to just compensation for condemned property at the time
that the government takes the land. If the valuation date occurs
weeks or months or years before the government actually takes the
land, and if the land’s value increases materially between the
valuation date and the taking date, then the landowner will not
receive just compensation if the court or hearing commission
rigorously applies the valuation date law. Legislatures can avoid
putting courts in the position of choosing between constitutional
and statutory provisions by drafting appropriate legislation. Clear
statutory guidance on what constitutes a taking and under what
circumstances courts must alter a condemnation award in order to
211. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1984). These
standards are admittedly less precise than bright-line standards, but they offer flexibility for
courts to deal with the intensely fact-specific process of valuing property at the proper time.
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provide just compensation will help produce consistent and
predictable results for courts and the parties who appear before
them.
Christopher A. Bauer
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APPENDIX
Date of Valuation Statutes in the Fifty States
and in the District of Columbia
STATE
Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California

*

CODE SECTION
[ALA. CODE §§ 181A-1 to -311 (1997
& Supp. 2001).]
ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.55.330 (Michie
2000).
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 12-1123(A)
(1994).
[ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 18-15-101 to
-1505 (Michie 1987
& Supp. 2001).]
CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1263.110–
.130 (West 1982).

**

BASIC PROVISIONS
No specific valuation date statute.

Date of issuance of summons.

Date of summons.

No specific valuation date statute.

Three options:
(1) Date of deposit of probable
compensation, unless there is an
earlier appropriate date.
§ 1263.110.
(2) Date of condemnation
proceeding commencement if
trial begins within one year of
commencement. § 1263.120.

* Bracketed code sections are the eminent domain codes of the states and district that
do not have date of valuation statutes.
** Importantly, states listed as having no specific valuation date statute may have a
judicially-created standard that governs condemned property valuation.
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California
continued

Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 38-1-114(1)
(2000).

Connecticut

[CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 48-1 to -27 (1994
& Supp. 2002).]
[DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 6101–
6115 (1999).]
[D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-1301 to -1385
(2001).]
FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 73.071(2),
74.051 (West 1987).

Delaware

District of
Columbia
Florida

Georgia

Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois

[GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 22-1-1 to -4-15
(1982 & Supp.
2002).]
HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 101-24 (1993).
IDAHO CODE § 7712 (Michie 1998).
735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 5/7121 (West 1992).

(3) Date of trial commencement
if trial begins later than one year
after condemnation proceeding
commencement, unless there is
landowner-caused delay.
§ 1263.130.
The earlier of:
(1) Date of possession.
(2) Date of compensation trial or
hearing.
Compensation assessment
remains subject to change for one
year after initial determination.
No specific valuation date statute.

No specific valuation date statute.

No specific valuation date statute.

The earlier of:
(1) Date of trial.
(2) Date on which title passes.
Or
Date of deposit if landowner does
not request a hearing.
No specific valuation date statute.

Date of summons.
Date of summons.
Date of filing complaint to
condemn.
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Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

IND. CODE ANN.
§ 32-24-1-9(g)
(Michie 2002).
[IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 6B.1–.59 (West
2001 & Supp.
2002).]
[KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 26-101 to -517
(2000).]
KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 416.660(2)
(Michie 1992).

Louisiana

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 19:9(A), :14, :153
(West 1979).

Maine

[Maine’s eminent
domain code sections
are disbursed
throughout the entire
code.]
MD. CODE ANN.,
REAL PROP. § 12103 (1996).
MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 79, § 12
(West 1993).

Maryland

Massachusetts

304
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Date of service of a
condemnation notice.
No specific valuation date statute.

No specific valuation date statute.

The date of taking, which is the
earlier of:
(1) Date the condemnor takes the
land.
(2) Date of compensation trial.
Not clear, but three possibilities:
(1) Time before condemnor
proposed the taking. § 19:9(A).
(2) Time of taking. § 19:14
(3) Time condemnor deposited
estimated compensation into
court registry. § 19:153.
Date of trial if determining
damage to remainder in partial
taking and if condemnor is port
authority, state university, or a
state department of public works.
§ 19:153.
No specific valuation date statute.

The earlier of:
(1) Date of taking.
(2) Date of trial.
Time before recording of taking
order.
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MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 213.70, sec.
20(3) (West 1998).
[MINN. STAT.
§§ 117.011–.57
(1997 & Supp.
2002).]
MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 11-27-19 (1972).
[MO. REV. STAT.
§§ 523.010–.215
(2002).]
MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 70-30-302 (2001).
[NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 76-701 to -726
(1996).]
NEV. REV. STAT.
37.120(1) (2001).

[N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 498-A:1 to
:31 (1997 & Supp.
2002).]
N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 20:3-30 (West
1997).

Date of filing.

No specific valuation date statute.

Date of filing complaint.
No specific valuation date statute.

Date of summons.
No specific valuation date statute.

Two options:
(1) Date of first service of
summons.
(2) Date trial commences if trial
begins more than two years after
first service of summons and the
delay was primarily caused by
condemnor or court backlog.
No specific valuation date statute.

The earliest of:
(1) Date of possession by
condemnor.
(2) Date condemnation action
commenced.
(3) Date that condemnor takes
action that “substantially affects”
the condemnee’s use and
enjoyment of the property.
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New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North
Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

306

N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 42A-1-24(A)
(Michie 1994); see
also id. § 42-2-15(A).
[N.Y. EM. DOM.
PROC. LAW §§ 101709 (McKinney 1979
& Supp. 1998).]
N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 40A-63 (2002).
N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-15-23 (1996).
[OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 163.01–.62
(Anderson 2001 &
Supp. 2001).]
[OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 27, §§ 1–16
(West 1997 & Supp.
2002).]
[OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 35.205–.415
(2001).]
26 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1-602(a) (1997).

[2003

(4) Date of blight declaration by
governing body if pursuant to a
planning board report, or, in the
case of a property on the
abandoned property list and
where there is no blight
declaration, the date of the
expiration of the condemnee’s
right to appeal the property’s
inclusion on the abandoned
property list.
Date of filing petition.

No specific valuation date statute.

Time “immediately prior” to
filing of petition or complaint.
Date of taking.
No specific valuation date statute.

No specific valuation date statute.

No specific valuation date statute.

Time immediately before and
immediately after partial taking.
No specific valuation date for
total takings.
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[R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 37-6-1 to -6.1-12
(1997 & Supp.
2001).]
S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 28-2-440 (Law.
Co-op. 1991).
[S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 21-35-1 to
-30 (Michie 1987 &
Supp. 2002).]
[TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 29-16-101 to 171202 (2000 & Supp.
2001).]
TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 21.042(b)
(Vernon 2000).
UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-34-11 (1996).
[VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, §§ 2805–2813
(1992 & Supp.
2002).]
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 25-46.3 (Michie
2000).
WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 8.04.092,
8.12.190(1) (1992).

No specific valuation date statute.

Date of filing condemnation
notice.
No specific valuation date statute.

No specific valuation date statute.

Time of the special
commissioners’ hearing.
Date of service of summons.
No specific valuation date statute.

The earlier of:
(1) Date of lawful taking.
(2) Date condemnor filed
petition.
(1) Date of trial order granting
the condemnor immediate
possession if condemnor is state
entity.
(2) Date of trial if condemnor is
city.
No specific valuation date statute
that governs county government
condemnations.
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West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming

[W. VA. CODE
§§ 54-1-1 to -2-21
(2000 & Supp.
2002).]
WIS. STAT.
§§ 32.09(1),
32.05(7)(c) &
32.06(7) (1998).

WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-26-703 (Michie
2001).

[2003

No specific valuation date statute.

(1) Date of recording of award in
county register’s office after
condemnor paid award if in a
condemnation action for sewers
or transportation.
(2) Date of filing of lis pendens if
in a condemnation action for
purposes other than
transportation.
Date that condemnation action
commenced.

Note on Uniform Eminent Domain Code: The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Eminent
Domain Code (“UEDC”) in 1974. See NOVAK ET AL., supra note 63,
§ 16.3, at 131 (1994). “Alabama is the only state to substantially adopt this
code, effective as of January 1, 1986.” Id. The UEDC contains a valuation
date provision that sets the valuation date at either the date on which a
plaintiff first makes a deposit or the date on which trial commences,
whichever comes first. Id. § 16.5, at 133.
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